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This paper reassesses the gains from trade for sub-Saharan Africa, and draws their 
implications for labour market adjustment and poverty reduction. It reviews previous 
studies on multilateral liberalization, focusing on the findings from computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models with relevance to African economies. The implications of 
these findings for poverty reduction are discussed. Our own CGE exercise supports the 
hypothesis that African countries cannot expect substantial gains from further multilateral 
liberalization. Moreover, given the sharp contraction of import-competing sectors in 
response to trade liberalization in many African economies, coupled with insufficient 
compensation through labour market adjustments in other sectors, this study suggests that 
the ultimate impact on poverty reduction is likely to be small or even negative. 
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1 Introduction 
Trade is commonly considered as one of the mainsprings driving economic growth and, 
by implication, poverty reduction. The rationale is two-fold: on the one hand, there is 
considerable, though not uncontested, evidence that trade has a positive effect on 
growth in developing countries1 and, on the other hand, growth is hypothesized to exert 
a positive impact on poverty reduction.2 Taking these two separate strands of literature 
together, the inference is often made that trade is good for both economic growth and 
poverty reduction.  
Nevertheless, in more recent years, a number of scholars have suggested that the gains 
from trade have been overstated.3 As one leading trade economist concedes: 
Few economists would doubt the beneficial effects of trade, despite the adverse 
impact on some groups. Yet the hard evidence supporting such gains from trade – 
either in a dynamic or static sense – is surprisingly thin. (Feenstra, 2001) 
Increasing doubts have also been expressed about the mechanisms by which the poor 
may benefit from trade expansion,4 though it is too early to judge the extent to which 
these concerns may have influenced mainstream debates.  
The main purpose of this paper is to contextualize the potential gains that can accrue 
from trade specifically for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and to draw implications for 
poverty reduction. In the immediately following section of the paper, we provide an 
overview of the recent empirical and theoretical literature concerning the gains from 
trade, focusing especially on the evidence for SSA. In the third section, we make 
preliminary observations regarding the use of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models for analysing the gains from trade. The fourth section reviews previous CGE 
studies, focusing again on the predicted gains for African countries. In the fifth section, 
we briefly discuss existing work on the implications for poverty reduction based on 
CGE simulation. In section six, we use a CGE model to simulate some of the potential 
gains for the most comprehensive form of trade liberalization – the complete 
elimination of tariff barriers and the suppression of export subsidies. Even under this 
most favourable of scenarios, our results indicate small benefits accruable to SSA. 
Finally, one particular area in which trade seems to be failing is in promoting poverty 
reduction on the continent. We provide some indication as to why this may be so, 
focusing particularly on trade’s failure to create sufficient employment while quite 
likely reducing wages. 
 
                                                 
1   See, inter alia, Dollar and Kraay (2001), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Fosu (1990). Greenaway, 
Morgan, and Wright (2002) specifically study the link between trade liberalization and growth, 
distinguishing between the long- and short run impacts, and conclude that whereas the short run 
effects might be negative, the latter are positive. 
2   Inter-linkages between trade and poverty reduction are well delineated in Winters, McCulloch, and 
McKay (2004). 
3   See Ackerman (2005), Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian (2005), Freeman (2004) and Weisbrot et al. 
(2002 and 2004). 
4   See in particular UNCTAD (2004) and Ravallion (2004). 2 
2  The relevance of openness and trade to Africa  
The general consensus in the trade literature is that both trade policy openness and a 
faster expansion of trade are positively correlated with growth, even after controlling for 
a variety of other growth determinants.5 For example, a measure of trade openness used 
by Sachs and Warner (1997) shows that it ‘generated the greatest impact among their 
baseline model variables’ (Fosu, 2001: 286). Indeed, Sachs and Warner (1997) 
estimated that had sub-Saharan Africa adopted the level of East Asian-type openness, its 
growth would have been 2.4 percentage points more. This is three times the 0.8 per cent 
mean annual per capita GDP growth for sub-Saharan Africa over the 1965-90 sample 
period’ (ibid., p. 286). With respect to the implications for the poor, Dollar and Kraay 
(2001) argue that developing countries that have become more open (including China 
and India), have grown faster, and have reduced their level of poverty more than the 
less-open group of countries. The evidence seems persuasive as well with respect to the 
impact of trade expansion on growth in Africa. For example, Fosu (1990a) and Lussier 
(1993) find a positive impact of exports, and Savvides (1995) reports positive effects of 
both exports and imports. Reviewing the evidence, Fosu (2001) concludes that the 
export effect for Africa could be considerable.  
Nonetheless, there are several caveats associated with the findings for both the openness 
and trade expansion. Since Sachs and Warner (1997) present the most persuasive 
evidence on the former in the case of Africa, their results deserve special attention. In 
the first place, the Sachs and Warner measure of openness is too inclusive, and it is thus 
unclear as to which variable really drives the observed favourable impact of openness, 
for instance, whether it is the overvaluation of the domestic currency or high import 
tariffs. Nor does their measure of openness take into account the potential problem of 
sequencing of policies – that is, closed countries that are able to build up their industrial 
sectors initially and then switch to more openness, as China and other countries have 
done (Fosu, 2001). In a critical survey of the literature, Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) 
suggest that the findings of Sachs and Warner and others are less robust than claimed, 
due to difficulties in measuring openness. Indeed, using more plausible measures of 
openness, such as reductions in both tariff and non-tariff barriers, they find little 
evidence in support of the openness–growth hypothesis. 
The Sachs and Warner results and similar studies are also subject to the important 
empirical criticism that openness itself is fundamentally endogenous (Feenstra, 2004: 
360). Several studies have attempted to address the endogeneity (Frankel and Romer, 
1999; Lee et al., 2004); the overall finding suggests that the effect of openness is small. 
Similarly, in a meta-study of cross-country regressions Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) report 
that trade volume is a significant variable in two-thirds of the regressions, though it is 
not amongst their sub-set of 18 robust predictors of economic growth.  
Birdsall and Hamoudi (2002) argue that neither the level nor the change in a country’s 
trade/GDP ratio is a good indicator of the ‘openness’ of the country’s trade policy, 
especially once shifts in terms of trade are accounted for. They argue that the empirical 
evidence offered by Dollar and Kraay, for instance, overstates the importance of trade 
policy in economic growth. This is because those countries with low trade/GDP ratios, 
which are used to identify countries that are less ‘open’, are also highly dependent on 
                                                 
5   For a review of this evidence for African economies see Fosu (2001). 3 
commodities for their export revenue. And these same countries have experienced 
stagnant or negative economic growth over the past two decades. By adding a 
‘commodity dependence’ dummy variable to the Dollar and Kraay growth regressions, 
Birdsall and Hamoudi reduce the magnitude of the apparent ‘growth effect’ of the 
‘openness’ variable by at least one-half.  
The Birdsall and Hamoudi result suggests that the composition of exports matters. 
Would primary exports generate as much growth as manufacturing exports, for 
example? According to Fosu (1990b, 1996), for example, the answer is no. 
Manufacturing exports apparently drive the export effect, especially as far as diffusion 
to the non-export sector is concerned. Using panel data for a sample of 41 African 
countries, Baliamoune (2002) also identifies the existence of certain ‘convergence 
clubs’ within Africa, and concludes that openness helps ‘relatively rich’ countries in 
Africa more than it does poor countries. Thus greater openness to international trade 
may actually be harmful to economies with very low per capita income. To benefit from 
international trade, a country apparently has to reach a certain threshold in terms of 
income and human capital. 
An additional concern about the above findings of the positive impacts of trade 
expansion is the issue of causality. In a study of 47 African countries, for example, 
Ahmad and Kwan (1991) find no evidence of a causal link running from exports to 
growth. Indeed, the only evidence that they uncover of a causal relationship runs in the 
opposite direction, from growth to exports. Nonetheless, reviewing the literature, Fosu 
(2001: 595) concludes that ’the issue of causality may not by itself be that important’, 
after all, as long as the relevant variables similarly affect both exports and domestic 
output.  
The composition of imports may also matter when it comes to openness. In principle, 
trade deficits should not impact negatively if they are being used to finance the import 
of intermediate capital goods and other technologies which will help spur growth. The 
evidence on the composition of imports to SSA by end-use is sketchy, but suggests that 
much of the growth in the deficit is taken up by consumer goods, rather than capital 
goods – particularly food crops (Ackah and Morrissey, 2005). Food imports for SSA 
have gone from negligible amounts in the early 1970s to as much as US$10 billion over 
the last 10 years. Thus levels of imports are likely to impact negatively on import-
competing sectors, and to have negative repercussions for both employment and poverty 
reduction.6 
Summarising the evidence, it is entirely likely that even though trade expansion could 
positively affect economic growth, the relatively small manufacturing content of 
                                                 
6   Illustrative of the complexity of the relationship between imports, income growth, employment and 
poverty reduction are the contemporary concerns over rising imports into SSA from other developing 
countries like China and India. On the one hand, these imports provide cheaper goods which benefit 
consumers. On the other hand, however, if they compete with domestic producers, then they may 
reduce employment. The impacts on poverty depend on whether the poor consume the goods that are 
imported from Asia, and on whether there is a negative effect on employment opportunities for 
unskilled workers. In some countries where a relatively high proportion of basic consumer goods are 
imported from China and India, such as Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania, the imports are primarily at the 
expense of other exporters rather than domestic producers, thus raising the real income of the poor 
(DFID, 2005). In the case of Ethiopia and Nigeria, however, there may have been negative effects on 
domestic output and employment as a result of increased import competition. 4 
African exports might imply that the growth impact would not be that large. Moreover, 
both the volume and composition of imports need to be factored into any evaluation of 
the relative merits of openness. In the following sections, we provide evidence on the 
openness impact using the CGE model, one of the most tractable tools available for this 
kind of analysis. We then assess how poverty may be affected through the labour 
market. 
3  Modelling the impact of trade liberalization on Africa – past studies 
Over the last decade or so, CGE modelling has become an increasingly popular tool for 
evaluating the impacts of trade reform on economic growth and its distribution across 
sectors. However, because the framework tends to be long run that often abstracts from 
short run realities of structural rigidities in developing countries, such as ‘missing’ or 
inefficient factor markets, some scholars have argued that they may not be appropriate 
for analysing the problems of the typical developing country (e.g., De Maio et al., 1999: 
Charlton and Stiglitz, 2004).  
Nonetheless, CGE models were used to estimate large welfare gains from the trade 
liberalization achieved under the Uruguay Round. The OECD, along with others, 
predicted welfare gains in the order of US$200 billion, approximately a third of which 
would accrue to developing countries.7 In hindsight, as we document below, it appears 
that these estimates were excessively optimistic. According to subsequent estimates, 70 
per cent of the gains from the Uruguay Round would go to the developed countries; 
more importantly, the remaining 30 per cent would be captured by few large export-
oriented developing countries. Indeed, the 48 least-developed countries (LDCs) could 
be worse off by some US$600 million a year within the first six years of the Uruguay 
Round (1995–2001), with SSA worse off by US$1.2 billion (UNDP, 1997, cited by 
Charlton and Stiglitz, 2005: 47). As Sachs (2005: 281) puts it: 
When huge gains are attributed to trade reforms (hundreds of billions of dollars 
per year), we need to look at the fine print: almost all of those gains accrue to the 
richest countries and the middle-income countries, not the poorest countries, and 
especially not the poorest countries in Africa. How, after all, could trade alone 
enable isolated rural villages in Africa to meet their basic needs? 
Francois (2000) summarizes three of the major CGE studies of the Uruguay Round, all 
of which predicted losses for SSA. One principal reason for these losses is the reduction 
in the terms of trade for African countries generally following the liberalization. A 
second reason is that the reduction in industrialized-country subsidies embodied in the 
Round would lead to higher prices for food imports to SSA (Francois, 2000).  
Finally, several countries would be hurt by the elimination of quotas in sectors like 
textiles and sugar which allowed them to sell a fixed amount of exports at a price that 
                                                 
7   Some observers went even further. During the early 1990s, when the Uruguay Round was on the 
verge of collapse, the United States’ trade team reportedly suggested that gains might be in the order 
of US$6 trillion dollars over fifteen years (Dunkley, 2000: 134).   5 
exceeded the competitive market price.8 This is the case for countries like Mauritius, 
where the IMF (2004) has predicted a loss as high as -11.5 per cent due to the erosion of 
preferential market access in both the sugar and textiles sectors. The IMF study 
identifies a group of countries where the estimated losses through preference erosion 
will be in excess of 2 per cent of export unit values (Table 1). Of the SSA countries 
identified, Mauritius aside, the most notable losers are Malawi (-6.6 per cent) and 
Mauritania (-4.8 per cent). Other countries negatively affected include the Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé and Principe, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, and Comoros. 
The downscaling of ex ante gains from trade liberalization, as estimated from CGE 
models, is shown in Table 2. These figures are generated on the basis of multilateral 
negotiations achieving total liberalization of trade (i.e., the complete elimination of 
tariffs). Whereas the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) simulations in 2002 were 
producing estimated gains of US$108 billion for developing countries, that figure was 
reduced to only US$22 billion in 2005. The World Bank’s Linkage model (also based 
on GTAP but allows for possible dynamic changes emanating from productivity 
increases of exporting) provides an even more dramatic scaling-down of the benefits for 
developing countries – from US$539 billion in 2003 to only US$90 billion in 2005. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the main beneficiaries are the developed countries, 
and the developing country share has indeed been progressively falling. 
 
Table 1: Percentage decrease in average export unit values following a 40 per cent cut in preference 
margins as a result of multilateral tariff reductions 
Least developed countries  Other developing countries  
Malawi 6.6  Mauritius  11.5  Albania  3.3 
Mauritania 4.8  St.  Lucia 9.8  Nicaragua  3.2 
Cambodia 4.1  Belize  9.1  Swaziland  3.0 
Bangladesh  3.9  St Kitts and Nevis   8.9  Serbia & Montenegro  2.9 
Maldives 3.5  Guyana 7.9  Tunisia  2.2 
Haiti 3.3  Fiji 7.8  Côte  d’Ivoire  2.2 
Cape Verde  3.3  Dominica  5.5  Morocco  2.1 
Sao Tomé and Principe  2.7 Seychelles  4.2  Dominican  Republic  2.1 
Tanzania  2.4  St Vincent & Grenadine  3.4     
Comoros 2.0  Jamaica  3.3     




                                                 
8   Note, however, that preference erosion could not be an explanation of the losses derived from the 
models cited in Francois (2000), for preferential tariff rates were not included in the GTAP database at 
the time. 6 
Table 2: Declining benefits of complete liberalization (billions of US$)  
Model Year  Developing  Developed  World  Developing country gains as 
share of global gains 
GTAP 2002  108  146  254  42.5% 
GTAP 2005  22  62  84  26.2% 
LINKAGE 2003  539  293  832  64.8% 
LINKAGE 2005  90 197  287  31.4% 
Source: based on Ackerman (2005: table 1) 
The principal reason for the downscaling of expected gains is the updating of the GTAP 
database – the GTAP 6 database uses data from 2001 (compared to 1997 for GTAP 5). 
This incorporates trade agreements reached up until 2005 in the baseline, including 
China’s entry into the WTO, the expansion of the EU in 2004 and the end of the 
Multifibre Agreement. In this latter database, then, the world has less protectionism to 
dismantle and so the benefits are correspondingly smaller (Ackerman, 2005: 3). 
Furthermore, when the erosion under WTO of preferential tariff arrangements is 
incorporated, SSA’s global gains drop by 55 per cent (van der Mensbrugghe, 2005: 64).  
4  Implications of CGE modelling for poverty reduction 
Attempts to derive poverty-reduction estimates from GTAP results have become 
increasingly common (Hertel et al., 2003). As this exercise cannot be done directly 
within the model, rough estimates of poverty impacts may be obtained by extrapolating 
from the results of income gains based on the patterns of poverty in particular 
economies. For example, Cline (2004) uses GTAP to estimate the per cent increase in 
factor prices accruing to households, and then multiplies this per cent change by the 
poverty elasticity (with respect to income). Using this methodology, Cline estimates 
from his static CGE model a reduction in the number of the global poor (those earning 
less than US$2 dollars a day) of between 110 and 120 million, or 4.3 per cent of the 
world total of 2.74 billion poor people. In the case of SSA, the number of the poor falls 
by about 16 million, or by 4 per cent. Cline then repeats the exercise using his ‘steady-
state’ model of free trade (i.e., including dynamic gains). The estimated reductions in 
poverty under this scenario are correspondingly larger: 535 million poor people 
globally, and 72.6 to 95.8 million in SSA. At its upper bound, these calculations imply a 
reduction of poverty in SSA of nearly 25 per cent.  
Nonetheless, Cline’s results have been challenged by Weisbrot et al. (2004). First, they 
note that Cline’s projections are overstated by approximately 20 per cent due to an error 
in calculation.9 Second, most of the people lifted out of poverty in these projections 
have their incomes raised from just below the international poverty level of US$2 
                                                 
9   To calculate his poverty reduction elasticities from the available Gini coefficients, Cline inadvertently 
uses the equation for the variance in place of the standard deviation. Cline himself concedes this error 
in a technical correction to his book, but insists that ‘the correction of the error causes a moderate 
reduction in the estimate for the long-term reduction global poverty from complete free trade, from a 
central estimate of 540 million people lifted out of poverty to 440 million’. See 
http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/379/errataiie3659.pdf 7 
dollars a day to just about this level. Thus Weisbrot et al. (2004: 2) argue that while this 
gain may correspond to a meaningful improvement in these people’s lives, ’most are not 
being advanced very much from an impoverished living standard, if at all’.  
Third, Weisbrot et al. query the use of the Gini coefficient as the basis for fitting the 
income distribution, arguing that ‘this is an arbitrary method that produces very poor fits 
in many instances’ (something which Cline himself concedes in chapter 1 of his book). 
Using the poverty rate to fit the distribution, instead, yields substantially lower 
projections, reducing poverty by just 80 million people worldwide. Fourth, Weisbrot et 
al. argue that the impact of trade liberalization is even less if expected economic growth 
is accounted for. When this factor is taken into account, Weisbrot et al. calculate that the 
impact on poverty reduction from trade liberalization will be less than 20 per cent of the 
Cline estimate. For SSA that would imply a reduction of the poor by less than 5 per 
cent.  
Fifth, Weisbrot et al. argue that less gains would be realizable by developing countries 
when one excludes gains attributable to their own liberalization, which should be treated 
separately, since they could independently act to reduce their own barriers. Finally, as 
Cline derived his calculations on the results of GTAP 5.0, which is based on 1997 data 
for tariffs and does not include preferential market access, the resulting welfare gains 
from trade liberalization would be far higher than could be more realistically expected 
using the GTAP 6.0 based on 2001 data.  
Accordingly, the World Bank has down-scaled its earlier estimates of the impact on 
poverty of freeing international trade of all barriers and subsidies. For example, the 
Bank had estimated that trade liberalization could reduce poverty in SSA by the year 
2015, using the US$2 a day measure of poverty, by as much as 113 million people, 
higher even than Cline’s estimates; however, subsequent revisions placed the estimate at 
only 20.4 million. Van der Mensbrugghe (2005) explains these downward revisions in 
the context of three key factors – a shift in the baseline poverty forecast, the 
incorporation of preference erosion and policy commitments in the GTAP database and, 
above all, a revision by the World Bank in the expected income-poverty reduction 
elasticities.10 In conclusion, studies on the global implications for poverty reduction 
from trade liberalization are constrained by data limitations, and are somewhat 
speculative. A more qualitative approach may be preferable. That is, first, what does 
CGE tell us about the expected production changes from trade liberalization and, 
second, what are the implications for poverty reduction via labour market adjustments? 
We answer the first question in the immediately following section using updated CGE 
results, and then explore the second question in the subsequent section.  
 
                                                 
10  Note that the estimated elasiticity for poverty reduction cited by Van der Mensbrugghe is relatively 
low in the case of SSA, especially vis-à-vis East Asia; for the US$2 per day poverty line, the elasticity 
for SSA is 0.5, compared to about 2.0 for East Asia. This difference may be attributable to the 
relatively high level of inequality in SSA (Fosu, 2006). 8 
5  Modelling the gains for Africa – a simulation exercise 
Presented in this section are updated CGE estimates of gains from trade liberalization, 
especially as they relate to changes in production, which affect derived demand for 
labour with implications for poverty reduction. The standard GTAP model, which is 
used in this exercise, is a static, multiregional, multisector, CGE model that assumes 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Input-output tables reflect the links 
between sectors. However, GTAP 6.0 that is employed here includes data for relatively 
large numbers of countries and sectors: 87 countries and 57 sectors. Although, for 
computational simplicity, the sectoral analysis was limited to three standard major 
aggregations (food, manufacturing and services), the simulation was carried out using 
the full 87 country disaggregations, instead of the usual regional aggregation (e.g. EU, 
SSA, etc.). This procedure then obviates the loss of important information. In models 
with a high level of regional aggregation, the removal of subsidies leading to higher 
food prices does not appear in the traditional results, as losses are compensated for by 
the positive welfare gains of other countries in the region. Thus, such CGE simulations 
could misleadingly show non-existence of losers from liberalization (Piermartini and 
Teh, 2005: 22).  
The standard model closure (i.e., the determination of exogenous and endogenous 
variables within the model) is adopted in our present simulation. The model assumes 
that investment adjusts endogenously to changes in savings, although the trade balance 
can vary, so that at a national level the change in exports need not equal the change in 
imports. Real exchange rates are implicit in the model and are assumed to be fully 
flexible, and in the labour market it is presumed that the amounts of economy-wide 
skilled and unskilled labour are fixed and cannot move between regions (although 
labour can move readily between sectors). In line with standard neoclassical 
assumptions, wage rates are assumed to be flexible.   
The objective of the simulation is to project, within the static framework of GTAP, the 
maximum gains accruable to trade liberalization. An ‘ideal’ scenario is therefore 
simulated, with a 100 per cent reduction in both tariffs and export subsidies. Unless, of 
course, African economies respond in a way which is not monotonic to multilateral 
reductions in trade barriers (i.e., reductions towards zero tariffs do not necessarily 
enhance welfare for Africa), this is likely to give an idea of the upper bounds of the 
potential gains from moving towards free trade. Nevertheless, the reality is that, even 
discounting current pessimistic forecasts for the likely outcome of the Doha Round, the 
present negotiations will inevitably stop a long way short of free trade.  
Table 3 shows the summary of the results on total welfare gains from our simulation. 
These are measured as the Equivalent Variation (EV) rather than GDP shifts. EV 
attempts to capture the ‘consumer surplus’, but except as a source of income EV 
underplays the impact of liberalization on the productive sectors of the economy. The 




Table 3: Summary of total welfare gains 
Region   Million US$  As % of total  
Total gains  94248  100.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa   259  0.27 






We first note here the relatively small size of the welfare gains for especially SSA. For 
total world gains, with world GDP in 2001 of US$ 31,022 billion and the predicted 
welfare increase of only US$ 94.25 billion, the gains from complete liberalization 
amount to mere 0.3 per cent of world GDP.11 However, the gains for SSA are even 
smaller – as a region with a total GDP of US$311.10 billion (i.e., approximately 1 per 
cent of world GDP), the estimated welfare gain of US$259 million is equivalent to only 
0.08 per cent of SSA GDP. In per capita terms, this represents a welfare gain for SSA 
equivalent to 36 cents per capita on a one-off basis.12 Moreover, even these results 
hinge on the inclusion of South Africa within the group of 12 SSA regions. Excluding 
South Africa, the welfare result is a loss for SSA of US$ 579 million.13 
If, as our results suggest, SSA stands to gain very little from multilateral liberalization, 
who does? Table 4 shows the top ten ‘winners’ from multilateral liberalization, on the 
basis of the computations for EV. This throws up the typical, but still somewhat 
surprising and counterintuitive, result that the largest single gains accrue to the ‘Rest of 
North Africa’ region, a composite aggregation of the Egyptian, Algerian, and Libyan 
economies. All three countries are large net-food importers, so a priori there would be 
an expectation of losses (as in the case of SSA) from the increased cost of food imports 
after liberalization. The only real explanation, though, resides in the degree and 
structure of the distortions of the domestic economies; the largest gains from 
multilateral liberalization are likely to occur in those sectors and economies where the 
distortions are highest. In relative terms the liberalising effect is strongest for those 
countries exhibiting highly uneven initial protection patterns, such as Korea, AESEAN 
countries, and the Maghreb (Bchir, Jean, and Labourde, 2005).14 At the same time, 
members of the Cairns group of countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, reap benefits 
from the agricultural liberalization.    
                                                 
11 This finding is in line with other comparable studies. The OECD (2003) obtains a benchmark estimate 
of US$97 billion as annual global static welfare gains from removing all tariffs, 70 per cent of which 
are accruable to developing countries. Moreover, nearly 80 per cent of these gains come from the 
removal of protection in industrial-country markets. 
12 This picture of small-scale gains from trade liberalization is corroborated by Mbabzai (2002) using a 
single country, multisectoral model of the Ugandan economy, a typical sub-Saharan country largely 
recognized as a front-runner in trade liberalization. In terms of short run welfare impacts of tariff 
liberalization, the author finds only minimal welfare gains largely accruing to agricultural households. 
13 Note, though, that SSA is not the only region where welfare losses are registered – out of the 87 
countries/regions in the dataset, 21 show absolute losses of welfare. 
14 It might seem counter-intuitive that a region like North Africa would be a major winner from trade 
liberalization. However, our finding is consistent with other recent research. For instance, Bchir et al. 
(2005: table 4) find, as we do, that welfare gains are largest for the Maghreb region. Bouet (2006: 10 
Table 4: The ten major ‘winners’ from multilateral liberalization 
Position   Country  Million US$ 
1  Rest of North Africa  13650 
2   China  12868 
3  Korea 12708 
4  Japan 8066 
5  Switzerland 5181 
6  India 4387 
7  Hong Kong (China)  3631 
8  Brazil 3535 
9  Argentina 2667 
10  Malaysia 2654 
Total top 10   
Top 10 as % of total  73.6 
Total impact  94248 
 
What is perhaps most remarkable is the high degree of concentration of the benefits 
from multilateral liberalization. Nearly three-quarters (73.6 per cent) of the total welfare 
gains accrue to only ten countries, a result that is only apparent from our relatively 
disaggregated model. For instance, Piermartini and Teh (2005: 31) stress the extent to 
which the welfare gains go towards developing countries in four of the six studies 
reviewed; however, they fail to reveal the concentration of the gains among few 
developing countries (principally China, Korea, and India). Our results clearly show the 
benefits from multilateral liberalization to be highly skewed, and not one SSA country 
is among the major beneficiaries. 
Welfare losses are also highly skewed (Table 5). Among the largest losers are the 
United States and Canada, as well as Mexico. This to some extent reflects the erosion of 
benefits from NAFTA, but the three economies also suffer major terms of trade losses, 
as their export values fall in world markets after liberalization. Gains from increased 
allocative efficiency through liberalization are simply insufficient to offset these losses. 
The ‘Rest of sub-Saharan Africa’ is a major loser in much the same way, allocative 
efficiency gains being completely overshadowed by terms of trade losses. Furthermore, 
these losses constitute a far larger share of GDP than in the case of the United States 
(1.17 per cent vis-à-vis 0.02 per cent). With 93 per cent of the losses accruing to these 
ten countries/regions, and around 75 per cent of gains to the top ten ‘winners’, trade 
liberalization in its most ambitious form in reality hardly affects the welfare of the 
countries involved – the majority are neither significant winners nor losers from trade 
liberalization. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
figure 13) reaches similar conclusions about large efficiency gains for North Africa. Apparently, due 
to the relatively high level of tariffs in North Africa, the initial distortions to be removed, and hence 
potential gains from liberalization, are correspondingly large. 11 
Table 5: The ten major ‘losers’ from multilateral liberalization 
Position   Country  Million US$ 
1 United  States  -2192 
2   Canada  -1960 
3  Rest of sub-Saharan Africa  -1843 
4  Russia -1831 
5  Rest of Middle East  -1299 
6  Mexico -981 
7  Venezuela -656 
8  Columbia -337 
9  Czech Republic  -172 
10  Chile -161 
Total top 10 losses   -11431 
Total top 10 losses as % of total losses  93.8 
 
Table 6: Summary results for SSA countries 


























Botswana  1.9 0.7 2.0 3.9 0.8 -5.4  101.0 
South  Africa  0.5 0.2 0.3 15.7 7.2  -1587.5  615.2 
Rest of South Africa  16.3  2.3 22.1  44.0 5.3 -588.2  838.3 
Malawi  4.7 1.2 8.8  37.2 13.0 -86.4 82.5 
Mozambique  -0.9 0.4 -2.8 5.0 10.2  -1.6  -32.9 
Tanzania  -1.1 0.3 -4.2 12.3 24.2 13.5 -99.7 
Zambia  -0.3 0.0 -1.2 9.9 7.8  -39.5  -12.5 
Zimbabwe  2.2 0.4 6.4 36.8  17.6  -179.9  196.2 
Rest of SADC  2.4  2.6  -0.3 27.7 18.6  -891.2  464.8 
Madagascar  0.3 0.1 0.5  11.0 13.0 -14.6 14.9 
Uganda  -1.2 0.0 -4.5 -1.5 8.3 55.3  -66.7 
Rest of SSA  -1.3  1.0  -4.8 17.2 23.8  -1317.2 -1842.6 
Table 6 reports the disaggregated simulation results for SSA. Out of the twelve 
countries/regions, five report absolute losses of welfare (Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Uganda, and the ‘Rest of SSA’). The welfare loss equivalent to -1.3 per cent of 
GDP for the ‘Rest of Africa’ is particularly significant, even if the negative result is 
mitigated by positive growth of GDP of 1 per cent. Furthermore, excluding the gains 
accruable to South Africa implies a net loss for the whole region of US$559 million. 
Not a highly significant amount in the context of the US$311 billion GDP of SSA, but a 
loss nonetheless. Welfare gains are large for only two countries/regions – the ‘Rest of 
South Africa’ (which comprises tiny Lesotho and Swaziland) and Malawi. Losses 
would once again seem to accrue principally due to large-scale terms of trade 12 
deterioration. While terms-of-trade changes have a relatively minor impact on income in 
economies where exports and imports are small relative to GDP, even moderate terms-
of-trade changes have a sizeable impact on national income in very open economies, 
which is typically the African case (UNCTAD, 2005: 101). 
Another important finding to highlight from our results is that while many countries in 
the region enjoy rather large increases in exports, in nearly all cases (Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Uganda and ‘Rest of Africa’ are exceptions), the growth of imports is 
considerably faster, resulting in a deteriorating trade balance. To some extent, therefore, 
this corroborates the hypothesis put forward by Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) 
regarding the impact of liberalization on the trade balance. Furthermore, in view of their 
political commitment to regional integration, many African countries may deem it 
undesirable that complete liberalization does not encourage intra-regional exports, 
which actually fall slightly despite the removal of all (tariff) barriers to trade (Annex 
Table 2). 
Nevertheless, one of the clearest potential negative impact of liberalization is that it 
could compound Africa’s difficulties with its sectoral specialization in commodities. 
Table 7: Trade balance by sector 
 Food  Manufactured  Services  Total 
Botswana 595.6 -587.0 -14.0  -5.4 
South Africa  1486.9  -3090.8 16.4  -1587.5 
Rest of South Africa  1685.3 -1794.4  -479.1 -588.2 
Malawi 75.1  -128.6 -32.8  -86.4 
Mozambique -13.5  -27.9  39.8  -1.6 
Tanzania -50.9  -30.2 94.6  13.5 
Zambia 45.0  -111.9  27.3  -39.5 
Zimbabwe 711.2  -765.9 -125.2  -179.9 
Rest of SADC  1414.2  -2258.7 -46.8  -891.2 
Madagascar -44.9  39.0  -8.7  -14.6 
Uganda -20.3  12.1  63.5  55.3 
Rest of SSA  -488.4  -2522.1 1693.3  -1317.2 
SSA total  5395.3  -11266.4 1228.3  -4642.7 
SSA – SA  3908.4  -8175.6 1211.9  -3055.2 
World   -9759.2  -23561.4 33320.6 0.0 
 
Table 8: Effects of a 100 per cent cut in tariffs and export subsidies on real incomes (percentage changes) 
 NAFTA  EU  Japan
Latin 
America SSA China  ROW 
Land 8.53  -3.26 -12.73 21.17 2.84  3.67  -4.62 
Unskilled labour  0.15  0.42 0.96  1.97  3.52 4.33  2.89 
Skilled labour  0.07  0.48  1.08 1.64 4.15  4.66  3.44 
Capital 0.23  0.41  0.97 1.66 3.48  4.43  3.27 
Natural resources  -0.61  0.78 2.79  -4.65  1.79  3.93  4.14 13 
Because of greater specialization, the CGE models almost invariably predict for Africa 
an increase in the production of primary commodities and a fall in manufacturing value-
added.15 This is reflected in both a sharp increase in manufactured imports and a 
dramatic drop in manufactured value added (Table 7 and Annex Table 1). 
To highlight the expected returns to the different factors of production from complete 
liberalization, Table 8 shows the results from a simulation scenario on an aggregated 
group for SSA vis-à-vis other regions of the world. The returns to land increase 
massively for Latin America (by 21.17 per cent), which presumably has a comparative 
advantage in agricultural production, but not so in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the gains are far more modest. Although the returns to unskilled labour improve 
by 3.52 per cent, the improvements in the returns to skilled labour are higher by 4.15 
per cent, suggesting that the gains from trade may again be skewed in favour of skilled 
labour. 
Finally, one point that is not always emphasized in CGE studies is the importance of the 
loss of tariff revenue by government. Despite more than a decade of reform in many 
SSA countries, government revenue from trade taxes is still one of the most important 
ways of financing public expenditure for basic social services, infrastructure and the 
like. According to the latest World Bank Development Indicators, for countries like 
Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal, trade taxes still represent 50 per cent, 42 per cent 
and 37 per cent of total government revenues, respectively (Table 9). Our ‘complete 
liberalization’ scenario would of course entail the total loss of these revenues. 
Moreover, as the World Bank acknowledges, country-wide safety nets seem more 
appropriate than special safety net programmes for trade-related problems. 
Table 9: Import duties as a share of total tax revenue in selected African countries, 2001 
Country  Share (%)  Country   Share (%) 
Burundi 16.4  Madagascar  53.5 
Cameroon   31.6  Mauritius  29.3 
Congo, D.R.  33.7  Senegal  36.5 
Congo 23.2  Sierra  Leone  49.8 
Côte d’Ivoire  41.8  Swaziland  54.7 
Ethiopia 26.3  Uganda  49.8 
Guinea 42.9     
Source: Development Indicators online and South Centre (2004) 
                                                 
15   See, for instance, Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe (2005). Of course, this is a static 
characteristic of the CGE model, which cannot predict the use of the rents accruing from increased 
exploitation of natural endowments (given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets, profits 
are by definition excluded from the model). Subramanian and Roy (2003), for example, document 
how the Mauritian business class ploughed the windfall gains accrued from the preferential 
arrangement based on EU sugar quotas into the export processing zone, investing in textiles and the 
like. The failure of CGE models to capture this kind of interaction between rents in one sector and the 
expansion of another is of course a major limitation, and makes them poor tools for predicting 
comparative advantage, being based as they are on a static assessment of current comparative 
advantage. In the final analysis, therefore, whether such specialization is harmful or not would depend 
on the ability of African countries to transform the gains accruable from commodities to an economy-
wide structural change. 14 
Fundamentally, it is difficult to justify safety net programs to poor people who 
suffer from trade reform and deny assistance to other poor people who suffer from 
unemployment from other disruptions such as technological change, or domestic-
demand shifts. As the main need for the poor during a difficult transition period is 
likely to be food, one approach is a time limited food subsidy and distribution 
program (World Bank 2002: 59). 
The problem is how such country-wide programmes can be financed unless alternative 
sources of income can be found. So far, the evidence suggests that other forms of 
revenue collection have been problematic. As Buffie (2001: 207) notes, ‘it is correct but 
not particularly helpful to object that the safety net should be financed by reducing other 
expenditures or by raising taxes’. Moreover, while social safety nets can mitigate the 
losses suffered by the newly unemployed, it also worsens the trade balance if higher 
spending on unemployment compensation or public sector employment schemes drives 
up the fiscal deficit (ibid.). This is potentially particularly problematic in the SSA 
context.  
6  Trade liberalization and labour market outcomes for SSA 
As argued above, while the CGE can be useful in estimating expected gains from trade, 
it is rather inadequate in terms of shedding light on poverty reduction. However, as 
shown, the methodology can also estimate changes in the levels and composition of 
production. Thus, it can provide implications for labour market adjustments via derived 
demand, and hence for poverty reduction. The current section explores this process. 
The above exercise suggests that the anticipated production increases in terms of the 
growth of GDP, or of exports relative to imports, from trade liberalization are likely to 
be small for SSA. It must be underscored that these CGE estimates tend to be long run 
in nature and may actually exaggerate the short run more realistic outcomes involving 
much smaller expected export expansion. Nevertheless, trade liberalization was 
undertaken in anticipation that much of the improvement in growth would emanate from 
the exportable sector in the face of a declining importable sector. Indeed, there is 
evidence that the importable sector in many SSA countries has been weakened by trade 
liberalization, leading to substantial employment losses and de-industrialization (Lall, 
1995). Some examples include (Buffie, 2001: 190–192): 
—  Senegal experienced large job losses following a two-stage liberalization 
program that reduced the average effective rate of protection from 165 per cent 
in 1985 to 90 per cent in 1988. By the early nineties, employment cuts had 
eliminated one-third of all manufacturing jobs.  
—  The chemical, textile, shoe, and automobile assembly industries virtually 
collapsed in Côte d’Ivoire after tariffs were abruptly lowered by 40 per cent in 
1986. Similar problems afflicted liberalization attempts in Nigeria. The 
capacity utilization rate fell to 20–30 per cent, and adverse effects on 
employment and real wages provoked partial policy reversals in 1990, 1992, 
and 1994. 
—  In Sierra Leone, Zambia, Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, and the Sudan, 
liberalization in the eighties brought a surge in consumer imports and sharp 15 
cutbacks in foreign exchange available for purchases of intermediate inputs 
and capital goods. The effects on industrial output and employment were 
‘devastating’. In Uganda, for example, the capacity utilization rate in the 
industrial sector languished at 22 per cent while consumer imports claimed 40–
60 per cent of total foreign exchange. 
—  Manufacturing output and employment initially grew rapidly in Ghana after 
liberalization in 1983 and generous aid from the World Bank greatly increased 
access to imported inputs. But when liberalization spread to consumer imports, 
manufacturing employment plunged from 78,700 in 1987 to 28,000 in 1993.  
—  Following trade liberalization in 1990, formal sector job growth slowed to a 
trickle in Zimbabwe and the unemployment rate jumped from 10 to 20 per 
cent. Adjustment in the nineties has also been difficult for much of the 
manufacturing sector in Mozambique, Cameroon, Tanzania, Malawi, and 
Zambia. Import competition precipitated sharp contractions in output and 
employment in the short run, with many firms closing down operations 
entirely.  
Against such a discouraging backdrop, we present in this section theoretical discussions 
within the neoclassical framework to shed light on the likely labour market adjustments 
in many SSA countries following trade liberalization. We shall then show implications 
for poverty reduction. Even within this framework, we find that any reductions in 
poverty emanating from trade liberalization would likely be minimal.  
Much of the work focusing on the labour market impact of trade in developing countries 
adopts a short run perspective, implicit in the fixed-factor model of international trade. 
Conversely, studies focusing on industrialized countries are often based on the long run 
framework of the neoclassical model of comparative advantage. The rationale is that 
while trade-related changes in developing countries are usually associated with one-time 
reforms in trade policy, most of the trade developments in advanced countries reflect 
long run tendencies in transport and communication costs, technology and factor 
endowments (Turrini, 2002: 12). 
Based on neoclassical theory, trade liberalization was touted in the 1980s as a solution 
for the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in many African countries beginning 
in the late 1970s. The idea was that liberalization would allow countries to shift 
production from the inefficient import-substitution industries to the exportable sector 
where they had comparative advantage. In theory, relatively unskilled workers, which 
African countries had in relative abundance, would benefit in terms of higher wages and 
employment, according to the well-known Hecksher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) 
framework. Unfortunately, this outcome is yet to be realized in many of these countries 
undertaking the trade liberalization reforms. Why? 
To appropriately answer this question, one needs to first appreciate the underlying 
dictates of the neoclassical model, especially as they relate to labour market 
adjustments. The basic framework modelling the realities of developing economies like 
those of African countries is a three-sector economy comprising importables (M), 
exportables (X) and non-tradables (N).16 All three sectors are assumed to use labour (L) 
and capital (K) in their respective productions. However, it is further assumed that the 
                                                 
16   See, for instance, Edwards (1988). 16 
importable sector is the most capital-intensive, followed by the non-tradable sector, with 
the exportable sector the least capital-intensive. That is, (K/L)M > (K/L)N > (K/L)X. The 
usual assumption of positive but diminishing marginal products of labour and capital 
applies. There is also a distinction between the short and long runs, with sector-specific 
fixed capital in the short run but mobile across-sector labour. In the long run, all factors 
are mobile across sectors but labour supply is perfectly inelastic. The equilibrium 




N , where j = L, K 
where VMP represents the value of the marginal product. For the short run, however, 
only j = L necessarily holds. 
Assuming no specialization (non-zero production in each sector), the qualitative results 
on employment and wages in response to trade liberalization in the form of a tariff 
reduction, based on comparative statistics, are summarized in Table 10. The results are 
provided separately for the cases of (1) no wage rigidities, and (2) the existence of wage 
rigidities in the form of a wage floor, such as a minimum wage in the importable 
sector.17 As expected, the long run results in the case of the absence of wage rigidities 
are consistent with the predictions of HOS, in that the wage increases in all sectors; 
meanwhile, though not apparent in the table, the increase in employment in the 
exportable sector is expected to exceed the decline in the importable sector and the 
indeterminate change in the non-tradable sector. Thus, in the long run, one should 
expect both wage and employment to increase economy-wide, resulting in poverty 
reduction.18 
For Africa, however, the more interesting case appears to be the short run. Available 
data show that following trade liberalization in many African countries there has not 
been a significant increase in especially private investment economy-wide or in the 
export sector. Hence, capital shifts to the exportable sector have been minimal, 
consistent with the short run underlying conditions. The short run results presented in 
Table 10, however, are not encouraging. They suggest that the wage will fall in all 
sectors (see the case of no-wage rigidities). Hence, the only hope for poverty reduction 
is a disproportionately high compensation in terms of employment expansion in the 
exportable or non-tradable sectors. Unfortunately, the expected employment change in 
the latter sector is indeterminate, so that the key to poverty reduction would appear to 
rest with employment increases in the exportable sector. Thus, we shall concentrate next 
on the employment adjustment in this sector. 
                                                 
17  The long run results are explained by the process of adjustments in capital as well as labour across 
sectors, with both demand and supply of labour increasing in the exportable sector while decreasing in 
the importable sector. The direction of change in employment is indeterminate in the non-tradable 
sector, though, arising from a simultaneous increase in demand from real income effects due to the 
tariff reduction and a decrease in labour demand resulting from capital deepening. The short run 
effects are explained by a decrease in labour supply in the importable sector but an increase in the 
exportable sector, while there is indeterminacy of employment change in the non-tradable sector due 
to a possible decrease in labour demand if the non-tradable is a substitute in consumption to the 
importable. For details, see for example Fosu (2002).   
18    This statement assumes that labour supply is not perfectly inelastic, contrary to the assumption 
underlying the long run scenario; otherwise, there would be no adjustment in employment. However, 
the more interesting case is the short run that approximates the SSA situation. 17 
Table 10: Sectoral (employment, wage) changes after trade liberalization 
  No wage rigidities  Wage rigidities 
  Short run  Long run  Short-run  Long-run 
Exportables (+,-)  (+,+)  (+,-)  (+,  ?) 
Importables (-,-)  (-,+)  (-,+)  (-,+) 
Non-tradables  ( ?,-)  ( ?,+)  ( ?,-)  (+, ?) 
Source:  Fosu (2002, table 8.1) 
Notes:   The table is adapted from Edwards (1988); see also Milner and Wright (1998). ‘Wage rigidities’ 
refers to the case of minimum wages. The first and second coordinates in parentheses denote 
changes in employment and wages, with ‘+’, ‘-’, and ‘?’ indicating respective positive, negative 
and indeterminate directions. For example, (+,-) shows positive and negative directions of change 
for employment and wages, respectively. The wage is defined as the nominal wage relative to the 
price of non-tradables. 
 
Figure 1 portrays the labour market of the exportable sector. The initial equilibrium is 
point A, with employment level L1
x. The short run adjustment following trade 
liberalization leads to an increase in labour supply from S1
x to S2
x, resulting in a new 
equilibrium of B or B′, depending on the nature of the labour demand. For a relatively 
elastic demand, the level of employment is L2
x, and is L2
x′ for the less elastic demand. 
From a policy perspective, therefore, it is important to have measures that are likely to 
augment the elasticity of labour demand, as well as facilitating labour mobility across 
sectors via reductions in mobility costs (Fosu, 2004). 
 















One of the factors influencing the elasticity of labour demand in the exportable sector 
(ED) is the supply elasticity of the product that forms the basis of the derived demand in 
the labour market. Unfortunately, the product supply elasticity is likely to be low for 
most African countries, mainly as a result of the high costs of doing business due to 
such factors as dilapidated physical infrastructure (transportation, communications, 
energy); onerous legal red-tape associated with establishing and running businesses in 
the formal sector; financial resource constraints; high costs of transmitting information; 
cumbersome taxation systems; and various forms of instabilities (e.g., political, import, 
and capital) (Fosu, 2004).  
Another factor affecting the wage elasticity of the demand for labour is the price 
elasticity of demand for the relevant product. Unfortunately, the primary-product nature 
of the exportable sector implies that the corresponding product demand is relatively 
inelastic. Hence, the derived demand for labour in the exportable sector would be 
relatively inelastic as well (ibid.). 
Also, the global perspective has now become increasingly relevant. Increased 
globalization has greatly expanded the investment opportunity set for potential 
investors. The elasticity of substitution with respect to cross-country investment is 
therefore likely to be high for most African countries. This relatively high elasticity 
would in turn lower ED.  
In effect, L2
X′ is the more likely scenario in Figure 1. The employment expansion 
resulting from a labour supply increase in the exportable sector following trade 
liberalization is likely to be small. Coupled with an expected reduction in the wage, it is 
unlikely that wage earnings in the exportable sector will increase much, if at all. 
Furthermore, as we have illustrated above, employment in the importable sector would 
fall with a decline of the sector’s output in response to trade liberalization. Economy-
wide employment would, therefore, likely decrease together with the wage. Thus, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that following trade liberalization in many African countries, the 
poverty rate has moved little from its roughly 45 per cent value in 1990. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper has reassessed for sub-Saharan Africa the welfare gains from multilateral 
trade liberalization and has drawn implications for labour-market adjustment and 
poverty reduction. Our CGE exercise supports the view that African countries cannot 
expect substantial welfare gains from further multilateral liberalization. This is not to 
suggest that countries could not benefit from further trade reform, but perhaps should 
reconsider the heavy emphasis placed so far on global trade liberalization policy – for 
Africa, it is not likely in itself to generate the large windfall gains that many have 
expected of it. There may indeed be other policies which produce greater benefits over 
the long run. For instance, policies to enhance technological acquisition may benefit not 
only the exportable, but also importable and non-tradeable sectors. Winters (2001) 
suggests that the gains from international migration may be three times as high as gains 
from trade liberalization. Thus a deeper look at the trade-off between different policy 
options is desirable.  19 
Meanwhile, the expected limited increases in production from trade liberalization in 
certain sectors, combined with the contraction of others, imply that we cannot anticipate 
much in terms of employment gains in African economies that have undergone 
liberalization. Our analysis on the linkages between trade liberalization and labour 
market adjustments suggests that, without sufficient reforms that render labour demand 
relatively elastic, these anticipated minimal gains from trade will imply only miniscule 
positive, and possibly even adverse, impacts on poverty reduction. 
 20 
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SA   Malawi Mozambique Tanzania Zambia  Zimbabwe
Rest of 







Food 634.8  2426.6  1809.9  52.9  -15.2 -85.7  47.4  785.4  1651.9 -62.8  -16.9  -1009.1 -34582.1 6219.2 
Mnfcs -713.5  -3076.9  -2045.3 -64.4  -25.7  -35  -107.9 -894.8 -2107.2  58.4  -7.3  -1319.2 -30127.1  -10338.8 
Svces   -37.1  615.3  84.1  7 43  106  6.1  31.9  584.4  8.4  32.9  2183.5 55053.6 3665.5 
Total   -115.7  -35.1  -151.3  -4.5 2.1  -14.7  -54.3  -77.4 129.2  4  8.7  -144.8 -9655.6 -453.8 
 
Table 2: Effects of a 100 per cent cut in tariffs and export subsidies on regional trade for SSA (millions US$) 
DTOT Botswana 
South 
Africa  Rest of SA Malawi  Mozambique Tanzania  Zambia  Zimbabwe
Rest of 
SADC  Madagascar Uganda 
Rest of 
SSA  Total 
Botswana 0  -60.2  -0.3  1  -0.1  1.2 0.3 6.9 -1.2  0  0.1 -0.7 -53 
South Africa  -240.7  0  131.6  72.5 44.2  7.7 95.3 365.6  103.5  0.6  -5.5  56.6 631.4 
Rest of South Africa -3.6  -620.3  -0.4  -5.8  -19.7 -9.2 -6.3 -1.9 -44  -1.7 -3.9  -32.6  -749.4 
Malawi  0.7 52.2  0  0  -11.8 -0.5 -5.9 -3.1  -1  0  -0.2  -12.6  17.8 
Mozambique 0  8.6  2.2  20.5  0  -0.1 0.3 8.1 2.2  0  0  0 41.8 
Tanzania 0.2  3  0.2  6.4  0.2  0  7 3.4  -2.9  0.5  3.9  36.9  58.8 
Zambia 3.9  8.6  4.6  -1.9  0  2.5  0 -4.8  -1.8 0 -0.2  11.9  22.8 
Zimbabwe 41  -24.5  184.8  -13  -0.7  -0.4 -41.9  0  -1  0  -0.8 -14.8  128.7 
Rest of SADC  0.7  -1.9  1.1  -0.5  0.2  -0.1 -1.8  -7  -0.2  -12  -0.3  -20.5  -42.3 
Madagascar 0  1.4  0  0  0  -0.4  0  0  -19.8  0  0  -0.7  -19.5 
Uganda 0.1  6.4  0.8  0  0.2 0.8  0.3 0 -4.4 0  0 -8.4  -4.2 
Rest of SSA  1.5  43.1  6.4  0.5 0.8  78.7  0.4  0.6  -6.2 0.9 -3.9  -174.9  -52.1 
Total -196.2  -583.6  331  79.7  13.3  80.2 47.7  367.8  23.2 -11.7 -10.8  -159.8 -19.2 21 
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